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We investigate whether socioeconomic status, measured by income and education, affects 
waiting time when controls for severity and hospital specific conditions are included. We also 
examine which aspects of the hospital supply (attachment to local hospital, traveling time, or 
choice of hospital) that matter most for unequal treatment of different socioeconomic groups, and 
how different behavior responses can create discrimination. The study uses administrative data 
from all somatic elective inpatient and outpatient hospital stays in Norway. The main results are 
that we find very little indication of discrimination with regard to income. This result holds both 
for males and females. We find some indication of discrimination of men with low education as 
these men have a lower probability of zero waiting time. We also find a pro-educational bias for 
women; as women with only primary education wait about 9 % (13 %) longer than women with 
upper secondary (tertiary) education. 
 
                                                 
♣ Corresponding author. 
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 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Waiting times for elective treatment are a distinguishing feature of a public health care sector. 
The basic reason is that access to care is free, or copayments are low, so demand will exceed 
supply in terms of short run treatment capacity. Waiting times impose a deadweight loss since 
they are costly to patients, and entail few benefits for the providers. Still, waiting times might be 
preferred over rationing mechanisms based on co-payments. One important reason for this is that 
rationing by waiting times is supposed to be independent of socioeconomic status and thus 
considered more equitable than rationing by co-payments. This argument is significant in many 
National health care systems.  
 
Whether rationing by waiting time is independent of socioeconomic status is an empirical 
question. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this issue in four ways. First, we 
investigate whether socioeconomic status, measured by income and education, affects waiting 
time when controls for severity of illness are included. Second, we investigate whether any such 
inequalities are due to geographic variation in the supply of hospital services or by unequal 
treatment of different socioeconomic groups. Third, we examine which aspects of the hospital 
supply (attachment to local hospital, traveling time etc) that matter most for unequal treatment of 
different socioeconomic groups. Finally, we shed lights on two different mechanisms that may 
create discrimination: the first mechanism is that patients with higher socioeconomic status are 
able to circumvent waiting lists and obtain immediately access to care by attendance at 
emergence primary health care centers located at hospitals. The second mechanism is that 
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 patients with higher socioeconomic status can obtain quicker access to care by exerting pressure 
while waiting or by influencing the referral sent by the primary care physician to the hospital.
 1  
 
We are able to investigate these issues since we have access to a rich data set from a country 
with the appropriate institutional settings. In Norway patients are required to see their primary 
care physician (GP) to obtain a referral to specialized care. However, when in need for 
immediate treatments, patients can visit emergency primary health care centers. Since 25 % of 
these centers are located at hospitals, patients might obtain direct access to specialized care by 
arguing the need for seeing a specialist when visiting these centers. 
 
The data we use are patient level administrative data from the Norwegian Patient Register 
(NPR). This dataset includes all patients treated by Norwegian hospitals. We focus on elective 
care patients. Hence we exclude acute care patients, i.e., patients that are directly brought to 
hospitals emergency rooms. Patients referred from their GPs will show up with a waiting time of 
at least one day, while patients that are given access to specialized care through attendance at 
emergency primary health care centers will be given zero waiting time. Socioeconomic status is 
measured by small area level education or income.  
 
When we investigate the sample of all elective patients, we find little evidence of discrimination 
with regards to income and with regards to education for men. We do however find a pro-
                                                 
1 We do not intent to explain whether any socioeconomic inequality in waiting time is caused by a person’s 
socioeconomic status or any personal variables that are correlated with socioeconomic status. Such an endeavor 
requires a much richer dataset than we have access to. 
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 educational bias for women; as women with only primary education wait about 9 % (13 %) 
longer than women with upper secondary (tertiary) education.  
 
Turning to the analyses of the sub-samples according to zero/positive wait we find indication of 
discrimination of both male and female patients with only primary education: these patients have 
a lower probability of obtaining zero waiting time. With respect to patients with a strictly 
positive wait, we find that only women with secondary education obtain shorter waiting time. It 
thus seems that men and women with at least one year of tertiary education obtain access to care 
by attendance at emergency primary health care centers. Women with only secondary education 
obtain quicker access to care by exerting pressure while waiting, or by influencing the referral 
sent by the primary care physician.  
 
We are not the only paper that investigates the relationship between waiting times and socio-
economic status. Siciliani and Verzulli (2009) analyze whether patients with higher socio-
economic status measured by educational attainment have lower waiting times for specialist 
consultation and non-emergency surgery using data from the Survey of Health, Aging and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE). The main result is that higher socioeconomic status contributes 
to a significant lower waiting time in many European countries with a National Health Service 
type of health system. One limitation with this study is that is makes use of survey data. The 
sample size is relatively small and waiting time information is self-reported. In addition the 
SHARE data does not contain any information on supply-side factors, which excludes the 
possibility to control for any such differences in the empirical analysis.  
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 Copper et al. (2009) and Laudicella et al. (2010) circumvent problems related to survey data and 
use administrative data to investigate whether socioeconomic status affects waiting time. Patient-
level data from administrative databases are linked with small area socioeconomic variables. 
Cooper et al. (2009) investigate changes in waiting times for key elective procedures (hip 
replacement, knee replacement and cataract repair) in the English NHS between 1997 and 2007, 
and analyse the distribution of those changes between socioeconomic groups. A patient’s socio-
economic status is measured by the Carstairs index of deprivation, and the data used are from the 
Hospital Episode Statistics database in England.
2 The main conclusions are that waiting times 
went down, and the variation in waiting times across socioeconomic groups was reduced. 
Laudicella et al. (2010) do also make use of data from the Hospital Episode Statistics. They 
investigate whether waiting time for inpatient hip replacement differs according to socio-
economic status measured by small area level income and skill deprivation from the indices of 
Multiple Deprivation 2004. Since small area level data are collected during the census in 2001, 
the analysis focuses on the year 2001/2002. The study does also include controls for severity (the 
type and number of diagnosis) and supply (hospital level fixed effects). The authors find 
evidence of inequality in waiting times favoring more educated individuals and, to a lesser 
extent, richer individuals: Compared with patients with least skill deprivation, patients in the 
second quintile wait about 22 days longer (9 %), and patients in the third-to-fifth quintiles wait 
about 32 days longer (13 %).
3   
                                                 
2 The Carstairs index of deprivation is a composite deprivation index based on car ownership, unemployment, 
overcrowding, and social class within output areas. It is calculated by the Office of National Statistics, see e.g. 
Morgan and Baker (2006). 
3 There is a broad literature measuring equality in health care utilization, van Doorslaer and Wagstaff (2000). This 
literature tests whether individuals with higher socioeconomic status have higher utilization (as measured by number 
of visits), after controlling for need (self-reported health). The evidence broadly suggests pro-rich inequality for 
physician visits. When visits are split between specialist visits and family-doctor consultations in gatekeeping 
systems, the evidence suggests pro-rich inequity for the former and pro-poor inequity for the latter (van Doorslaer et 
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 Our study differs from these studies in various ways. Most notable it differs from Siciliani and 
Verzulli (2009) since we use administrative data instead of survey data. With respect to the two 
latter studies our approach is different since it presents data and results from a different county 
than England. More importantly however is the fact that we cover the total somatic patient 
population, and not some specific procedures. We believe this is important since the socio-
economic variables used in Copper et al. (2009) and Laudicella et al. (2010) are calculated based 
on the total population. If the population of patients receiving hip-replacement differs from the 
total population, say e.g. by age, selecting certain treatments might induce a bias in the analysis. 
Like Laudicella et al. (2010) we include controls for severity and controls for hospital specific 
conditions. Our controls for hospitals specific conditions are however more refined since we 
include controls both for local hospital, distance to the hospital, and whether treatment is given at 
the local hospital or a university hospital. Finally, we also investigate how socioeconomic status 
affects access to specialized care by attendance at emergence primary health care centers located 
at hospitals.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we give a short description of the Norwegian 
specialized health care sector. Section 3 presents the data and the methodology, while section 4 
contains the empirical analysis. Concluding remarks are given in section 5.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
al., 2004). Grasdal and Monstad (2009) analyze and compare inequality in use of physician visits in Norway based 
on survey data. For specialist services they find pro-rich inequality in the probability of seeing an outpatient 
specialist. There is a limited literature which makes use of administrative data to investigate inequalities in health 
and health care. On length of stay: Cookson and Laudicella (2009); on health care utilization: Propper et al. (2005); 
on prioritisation and patients’ rights: Carlsen and Kaarboe (2010). 
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 2.  INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES 
The Norwegian specialized health care sector is predominantly publicly owned and organized as 
state owned enterprises within five (north, mid, west, south, east) regional health authorities 
(RHAs).
 4 The RHAs have the responsibility for providing specialist health care to all patients 
within the region. The RHAs receive an annual budget from the Norwegian Government, based 
on a weighted capitation formula. In addition, the RHAs receive an activity-based grant which 
size is proportional to the number and composition of hospital treatments. The activity-based 
component is about 40 % of the somatic budget.  
 
Provision of specialist health care is organized through health enterprises (hospitals) owned and 
governed by the RHAs. These organizations can also contract with private suppliers for 
providing treatment. This outsourcing is in effect quite small compared to the overall treatment 
activity, and confined to a few diagnoses. Patients are free to choose hospital at the national 
level, but few patients receive treatment outside of the hospitals’ natural catchment areas, 
Vrangbæk et al. (2007). There are substantial travel distances in Norway, and reluctance to travel 
is large, Monstad (2007).   
 
With the exception of acute care patients, patients are referred to further treatment from a 
primary care physician. Thus, there is a gate-keeper system regulating access to planned 
treatment. When in need for immediate treatment, patients are visiting emergence primary health 
care centers. These are the responsibilities of the municipalities. About 25 % of the emergency 
                                                 
4 Hagen and Kaarboe (2006) and Magnussen et al. (2007) provide for more detailed descriptions of the Norwegian 
hospital sector.  
7 
 primary health care centers are located at hospitals (National Center for Emergency Primary 
Health Care, 2009). 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The empirical analysis makes use of data merged from three data sets. The first data set is the 
Norwegian Patient Register (NPR) for the period 2004-05. This individual level register contains 
information about waiting time and patient characteristics such as age, gender, place of residence 
(municipality or part of city), main and secondary diagnoses, and surgical procedure codes for all 
elective inpatient and outpatient treatment in somatic hospitals. The waiting time is measured 
from referral until the patient meets with a specialist from the hospital. This indicates starts of 
treatment, even though further diagnosing of the patient may occur.  
 
The second data set is compound from the tax and education registers of Statistics Norway. Since 
the NPR (at least so far) does not have a unique personal identifier, information about 
socioeconomic status cannot be linked at the individual level. However, since the register has 
information about each hospital stay according to gender, year of birth and resident municipality, 
patients can be uniquely assigned to population cells that combine gender, age and municipality. 
For each cell, Statistic Norway has computed average income in 2004 and the population shares 
with primary, secondary and tertiary education by the end of 2004.
5,6 This approach produces 
43 989 data points for income and educational achievement. 
                                                 
5 Income and education level are computed for patients aged 25 and older. For each gender and municipality, we 
have collapsed cells with birth year 1917 or earlier into one cell since a large share of these cells were empty. The 
same has been done for cells with birth year 1918-1922.   
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The third data set measures the distance from a municipality to be served to the municipality 
where the service is provided. Distance is measured in travel time by car from one municipality 
center to another.   
 
Not all observations are included in the analysis. First, we focus on patients with a date of 
referral during the first eight months of 2004 that got treatment during 2004 or in 2005.
7,8 
During this period 1 471 317 hospital episodes took place. Second, we drop prenatal care visits 
(73 375 observations dropped). Third, we drop 22 072 observations from one hospital since 98 %
of the patient episodes are missing waiting time information. Finally, to avoid serial hos
admissions we only include the first hospital stay for each patient (496 467 observations are 
dropped). Since NPR doesn’t have unique personal identifier, we assume that all hospital 
episodes where a patient is given the same date of referral, and has the same sex, age, main 




                                                                                                                                                            
9 After excluding these observations we are left with a total of 879 403 patient episodes at 
74 different hospitals. 
 
 
6 Our income variable is annual pre-tax income from employment, self-employment and transfers (pensions, social 
assistance benefits, etc). Capital income is not included since the administrative registers of Statistics Norway lack 
data about capital gains. 
7 The data period is chosen to match the data on income and education. Some patients will wait longer than 15 
months, and receive treatment in 2006. But since only 4 % of the patients referred in this period wait longer than one 
year, we believe that only a few patient stays are excluded by design.  
8 Our rational for focusing on patients with a referral date between 1. January 2004-31. August 2004 is a change in 
the law of Patients’ Rights introduced 1. September 2004. The Law may have changed the prioritisation practice of 
the hospitals. Askildsen et al. (2010a; 2010b) and Januleviciute et al. (2010) analyse the effects of the reform. The 
authors find very little effect of the reform. 
9 In section 4.1 we check whether the results are sensitive to this assumption. 
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 Table I presents our data set. We first notice that the distribution of waiting time is skewed, as 
average waiting time is about 81 days, while the median waiting time is 36 days. 20,7 % 
(24,4 %) of the female (male) patients have zero waiting time, while 4 % of the patients waited 
longer than one year (not shown in the table). Table I shows that men experience shorter waiting 
time than women. Average waiting time for women is about 5 days longer than for men. Waiting 
time is also shorter for elderly patients (not shown in Table I). We also notice that the mean 
number of diagnoses (main and secondary) is 1.24 and that the corresponding number of 
procedures is 2.51. Turning to the socioeconomic data we see that the average earning (less 
capital income) of the population is NOK 239 000 ($40 000), and about 72 % (18 %) of the 
population has completed upper secondary education (at least one year of tertiary education). 
Average male income is about NOK 90 000 higher than female income, and a larger share of 
males has upper secondary education. When it comes to tertiary education, more women than 
men have reached this education level (about 3 percentage points). Finally, we note that the 
sample includes 43 989 data points. Hence, there is much variation in the socioeconomic 
variables.  
[Table I about here] 
To check whether the relationship between income and waiting time is non-linear we include 
dummy variables for sex- and age-specific income quintiles. That is, a male (woman) is placed in 
the highest income quintile if s/he belongs to a cell
10 in which average income is among the 
20 % highest income relative to all men (women) born the same year.  
                                                
 
 
10 A cell is a combination of gender, age, and place of residence.  
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 From the NPR data set we have detailed information about patients’ medical conditions. The 
data set contains information about patients’ main diagnosis, the number of secondary diagnoses 
(up to seven), and if any surgical procedure codes (up to ten). To identify the relationship 
between waiting time and socioeconomic status we include fixed effects for medical conditions 
to analyse variations in waiting times for patients with the same medical condition.  
 
In the analyses we include three alternative specifications of medical conditions. The idea is to 
check whether the effects of socioeconomic status are sensitive to how well the seriousness of 
illness is controlled for. The first specification includes fixed effects for ICD-10 main 
diagnosis.
11 There are 6 812 (6 162) different main diagnoses for females (males) patients in the 
sample. The second specification includes fixed effects for combinations of main and secondary 
diagnoses. This way of specifying medical conditions gives 48 910 (40 043) different 
combinations for female (male). The third alternative includes fixed effects for all combinations 
of main diagnosis, secondary diagnoses, and surgical procedure codes. This specification of 
medical conditions gives rise to 125 990 (106 464) different groups of female (male) patients.
12  
 
In addition to controlling for severity (medical condition) we include controls for the following 
hospital specific conditions. First we include fixed effects for local hospitals. A local hospital is 
defined as the hospital that has the highest number of treatments for a given municipality, sex 
                                                 
11 The International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD) provides codes to 
classify diseases and a wide variety of signs, symptoms, abnormal findings, complaints and external causes of injury 
or diseases. Norway uses the ICD-10 version to classify all hospital stays. 
12 Some of the groups only include one patient so the effective number of observations that are used to identify the 
relationship between waiting time and socioeconomic status is lower, but still above 300 000 (400 000) for males 
(females).  
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 and main diagnosis (first letter in the ICD-10 code).
13 Second, we include a variable describing 
the distance from the hospital to the municipality center. This variable is interacted with age (10-
years cuts) since the effect of travel distance might vary with age. Our rationales for including 
this variable are i) that people living closer to the hospital might fill open slots on short notice 
and hence obtain lower waiting time, and ii) that people living close to the hospital might also 
show up at the hospital without a referral, but still get elective treatment, for instance by seeing a 
specialist during a visit to an emergency primary health care center. Finally, we include a 
dummy variable that captures whether treatments are given at the local hospital and dummy 
variables for the university hospitals. The rational is that patients in Norway have free choice of 
hospitals
14, but patients cannot choose to receive treatment at university hospitals.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
To analyze how socioeconomic status affects waiting time we first estimate the following OLS-
model.  
i 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 i SES Choice D 2 AGE HC MC 1 AGE wt ε + δ + δ + ⋅ δ + δ + δ + δ + δ =
r r r r r r
, where  
wti is the log of the number of days (plus one) between the days of referral and admission, AGE1 
is an age-vector, MC is a vector of medical conditions, HC is a vector related to the hospital 
supply, AGE2 is a vector of 10-years age-cuts, D is the traveling time to the closest hospital, 
CHOICE is a dummy variable indicating whether treatment took place at the local hospital, SES 
is the patient’s socioeconomic status (personal income or education level) and εi is an error term. 
The scalars δ0, δ5 and the vectors  6 4 1 ,δ δ − δ
r r r
are parameters to be estimated.  
                                                 
13 64 hospitals are local hospital for at least one combination of diagnosis, sex and municipality.  
14 Since 2001, patients have the right to choose which hospital to get treatments.  
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Secondly, we estimate how socioeconomic status affects the probability of zero wait and waiting 
time given it is strictly positive. Due to the large number of fixed effects, the zero wait 
regressions are estimated by linear probability models (OLS).  
 
We first consider the effects of income on waiting time. Persons in the highest income quintile 
are the reference category. The results are presented in Table II. We present the results for men 
and women separately. 
 
First we present the result when only fixed effects for birth year are included. The next three 
columns include the three alternative fixed effects for medical specifications. In regression (2) 
we control for main diagnosis, regression (3) controls for combinations of main and secondary 
diagnoses, while regression (4) in addition controls for procedures.  
[Table II about here] 
Income has a strong and significant negative effect on waiting time for males. Notice that the 
results are not much affected by whether and how we control for medical condition. But the 
effect of income becomes more linear the more extensive the control for medical condition is; 
the relationship between income quintile and waiting time is almost linear in regression (4). 
Patients in the lowest income quintile wait about 26 % longer than patients in the reference 
category. For women the results are less uniform. Now it matters how we control for medical 
condition. Without such control the relationship between income and waiting time is U-shaped, 
13 
 regression (1); highest and lowest income quintile wait longest. But when maximal medical 
controls are included, regression (4), we see a clear pro-rich bias. Women in the lowest income 
quintile wait about 10 % longer than women in the highest and third highest quintile, and about 
18 % longer than women in the second highest income quintile.   
 
In regression (5) we include dummy variables for local hospitals. For both sexes local hospitals 
basically explain the income gradient. Only men in the lowest income quintile have a waiting 
time that is significantly different from the waiting time of the reference group (3.6 % higher). 
For women, only those in the second highest income quintile have significantly lower waiting 
time (6.3 %).  
 
When we in addition include the travel distance to the closest hospital (interacted with 10-years 
age-cuts) there is no significant difference in the waiting time for males with different income, 
see regression (6). For women we see a slight pro-poor bias; those in the highest income quintile 
wait about 4-6 % longer compared to all other women. Finally we include the choice variables to 
check whether persons with higher income are more prone to use patient choice to obtain lower 
waiting time. The results are presented in regression (7). We see that introduction of the choice 
variables does not significantly affect the results.  
 
We now turn to the analysis of the sub-samples according to waiting time. The results are 
presented in Table III. We first comment on the results for men. From Table II we know that the 
14 
 relationship between income quintiles and waiting time is approximately linear when no controls 
for hospital supply were included (Table II, regressions 1 and 4). When waiting times are split 
according to zero and strictly positive wait we notice that most significant results are obtained 
for the probability of zero waiting times (Table III, regressions 1a, 4a). Waiting time, given a 
strictly positive wait, is however significantly shorter for those with highest income (same table, 
regressions 1b, 4b). When hospital effects are included, we obtain similar results as for the full 
sample: there are only small differences in the probability of zero wait/waiting time and no 
indications of discrimination (Table III, regressions 7a, 7b).  
[Table III about here] 
For women, waiting times differences showed up only when hospital supply variables were 
excluded, and when extensive controls for medical conditions were included (Table II, regression 
4). The result is that women with lower income wait longer. When we split the sample we see 
that this result is caused by a lower probability of zero wait for women with low income (Table 
III, regression 4a, 4b). Waiting time, given a strictly positive wait, does show a weak pro-poor 
bias as women in the three lowest income quintiles wait about 2,6-4 % shorter. When hospital 
controls are included most results are insignificant. The exception is for women in the 3
rd-4
th 
income quintiles. These women have about one percentage point higher probability of obtaining 
zero wait (Table III, regressions 7a, 7b).  
 
We then turn to the effects of educational achievement on waiting time. The results are presented 
in Table IV.  
[Table IV about here] 
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 First we notice that there is no clear pattern between the coefficient of tertiary education and the 
different ways of including fixed effects for medical conditions for men; the estimated effect of 
tertiary education is between -0.34 and -0.41 and significant. Waiting time for men with higher 
education is thus about 40 % lower than the waiting time for men without upper secondary 
education. Furthermore, and in contrast to the result we obtained for income, the effect is still 
significant when we include fixed effects for local hospital, regression (5). The effect is however 
reduced by about 40 %. When distance is included in addition to fixed effects for local hospitals, 
the effect becomes small and insignificant, regression (6). Hence, local hospital and distance 
explain each about half of the educational gradient. We also notice that the coefficient for upper 
secondary education is insignificant and small in all regressions. The main separation is between 
males with higher education and the rest of the male population.  
 
Turing to the regression results for women, we see that the results are sensitive to choice of 
empirical specification. When we include maximal controls for medical condition (regression 
(4)), the coefficients for upper secondary and tertiary education are almost identical (-0.23). 
Women with only primary education thus wait about 23 % longer than their sisters with at least 
upper secondary education. In regression (5) dummies for local hospitals are included. The 
effects are not uniform; the coefficient of upper secondary (tertiary) education decreases 
(increases). When we in addition include distance (regression (6)), we see that the effect of 
education becomes smaller. The same pattern occurs when choice and university hospital are 
included as dummies, but the change in the coefficient is relatively small, see regression (7). The 
effect of education, however, is still significant and relatively large; women with upper 
secondary (tertiary) education wait about 9 % (13 %) shorter than women with only primary 
16 
 education. The average waiting time for women is about 83 days, so women with at least upper 
secondary education wait about 8-11 days shorter. From this we conclude that distance, choice of 
hospital and discrimination seem to explain a pro-educational bias for women, but that the 
explanatory effect of choice of hospital is relatively small.  
When we split the sample and consider the results without controls for hospital supply, we notice 
that the probability of zero wait is higher for men with tertiary education. This result holds both 
without and with controls for severity (Table V, regressions 1a, 4a). When we look at men who 
experience a strictly positive wait, we find that men with higher education wait shorter. But this 
result is significant only when no controls for severity are included. When hospital controls are 
included, we see that the result of no discrimination (Table IV, regression 7) is caused by two 
opposite effects; men with tertiary education experience a higher probability of zero wait, but 
given a positive wait these men actually wait longer (Table V, regressions 7a, 7b). Hence there is 
some indication of discrimination for men with zero wait.  
 
Table V, regressions 4a, 4b show that women with only primary education experience both a 
lower probability of zero wait and longer waiting time given a strictly positive wait. When 
controls for hospital supply are included these women are still worst off (Table V, regressions 
7a, 7b). It thus seems that these women are discriminated against. Notice however that the 
mechanisms of discrimination are different for women with only secondary education and 
women with higher education: the latter group has a higher probability of obtaining zero wait, 
while the former group experiences shorter waiting time given a strictly positive waiting time. It 
thus seems that women with higher education are able to circumvent the waiting list by 
17 
 attendance at emergency primary health care centers. Women with only secondary education 
seem to obtain shorter wait either by influencing the referral from the primary physician or by 
contacting hospitals while they are waiting.  
4.1. Sensitivity analyses 
To check the robustness of the conclusions we have looked into three possible sources that might 
bias the estimates. The sensitivity analyses are shown for regressions (4) and (5) for income 
(Table VI) and regressions (4), (5) and (7) for education (Table VII).
15 The first column of Table 
VI and VII replicates the results of Table II and III. Again we present the results for men and 
women separately.  
[Tables VI and VII about here] 
The first sensitivity check we perform is whether treatments with exceptionally long waiting 
time affect the results. In the sensitivity analysis we change the date of referral to include all 
treatments with up to 18 months waiting time. The results are presented in column (b) in Table 
IV and V. We notice that the estimated effects of income in regression (4) become slightly 
stronger when the referral period is shortened. Since the number of excluded patient episodes is 
higher the longer the time of referral, this may indicate that the results presented in Table II 
underestimate the effect of income. Quantitatively there are however no reasons to believe that 
the bias is large. Concerning education we observe different effects of changing the referral 
period for men and women. For men the coefficients are slightly smaller, while the opposite is 
the case for women. The main conclusion is still that the results are not very sensitive to the 
choice of the period of referrals.  
                                                 
15 The sensitivity analyses for the sub-samples according to waiting time are similar to what is presented in Table VI 
and VII. These results are available upon request.  
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Since we cannot follow patients over time and patients that move between hospitals, we have 
assumed that two patient episodes with the same i) date of referral, ii) sex, iii) age, iv) place of 
residence (municipality or part of city), and v) main diagnosis relate to the same patient. The 
consequences of this assumption are that some patient episodes that are included might be 
following up-consultations for patients that already are treated, and that some patient episodes 
are excluded from the data set even if they are the initial treatment. In the sensitivity analyses we 
remove patients from the five largest municipalities/parts of city that have the highest number of 
treatments (since the problem will be more severe in large municipalities).
16 We also add the 
criterion that two patient episodes also must include the same secondary diagnoses (in addition to 
criteria i)-v) above before a patient episode is dropped). These results are presented in columns 
(c) and (d) in Table VI and VII. We conclude that the results are not sensitive to the way patient 
episodes are defined.  
 
We also check whether the results are sensitive to the way patients are admitted to hospitals. The 
issue is that differences in the medical conditions of patients may be correlated with the way 
patients are admitted, even though we control thoroughly for diagnoses and procedures. Hence, 
we include separate fixed effects for medical conditions for the three different ways of admitting 
patients; inpatient treatment, day treatment, and outpatient treatment. The results are presented in 
column (e) in Table VI and VII. In these regressions we thus control for all possible 
combinations of the way patients are admitted, main diagnosis, secondary diagnoses and 
                                                 
16 The average number of inhabitants per municipality in 2006 is 8296 when the five largest municipalities/parts of 
city are excluded. 
19 
 procedures. We notice that the results are not sensitive to the way patients are admitted to 
hospitals.  
 
Finally, and as an alternative to the OLS-specification we have estimated some simple duration 
models of the relationship between socioeconomic status and waiting time. Including a full set of 
fixed effects for medical condition (either of the three fixed effects alternatives) in a duration 
analysis would require computer resources that vastly exceed ours. However, comparison of 
OLS and duration analyses with parsimonious specifications indicate that the results are very 
similar. This is to be expected since the combination of LOG waiting times and OLS is 
approximately equivalent to a basic duration model (proportional exponential hazard rate). 
17,18 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have investigated whether socioeconomic status, measured by income and 
education, affects waiting time when we control for patients’ medical condition (severity of 
illness) and hospital specific effects like local hospital and distance to hospital. We find very 
little indication of discrimination with regard to income. This result holds both for males and 
females. We find some indication of discrimination of men with low education as these men 
have a lower probability of zero waiting time. We also find a pro-educational bias for women; as 
women with only primary education wait about 9 % (13 %) longer than their sisters with upper 
secondary (tertiary) education. The analyses of the subsamples show that different mechanisms 
                                                 
17 We thank Luigi Siciliani for pointing out this result.  
18 The results are available upon request.  
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 are behind this result: Women with at least one year of tertiary education obtain access to care by 
attendance at casualty wards/clinics, while women with only secondary education obtain quicker 
access to care by exerting pressure while waiting, or by influencing the referral sent by the 
primary care physician. The results are insensitive to the robustness checks we perform.  
 
One of the novelties of our analysis is that the data allows us to include very extensive controls 
for patients’ severity. This is important since, according to the prioritisation guidelines often 
used in many health systems of the National Health Service type, more severely ill patients 
should have shorter waiting times (Sicililani and Hurst, 2005; Gravelle and Siciliani, 2008). 
From the results we see that controlling for severity seems to be more important for women than 
for men. This holds true both for income and education. One reason why controlling for severity 
is more important for women might be that women with higher socioeconomic status have better 
ability to communicate with the medical providers and argue for the need of lower waiting time. 
Men on the other hand, might not be so active “complainers”.  
 
The fact that a socioeconomic gradient might give unacceptable equitable consequences raises 
the question why individuals experience relatively longer waiting time. What we have done is to 
examine whether hospital factors explain the socioeconomic differences in waiting time, or if the 
socioeconomic gradient still remain when factors like attachment to local hospital and distance to 
hospital are controlled for. That is, we do not try to explain inequalities with patient level 
variables. Such an approach would not only require that we include income and education in the 
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 same regression
19, but also that we have access to data on other variables that describe a patient’s 
personal resources and that are correlated with income and/or education. Candidates for such 
variables are attachment to the labor force, (employed, unemployed, or on social security) and 
family relations, just to mention two. In addition one has to tackle the problem of reversed 
causality; the more treatment one gets, the healthier one is and the easier it is to obtain income 
and, for students, education. Instead our approach is to focus on two variables that are commonly 
used to describe inequality, check how they are related to waiting time, and try to explain any 
differences by hospital specific conditions relative to where patients’ live.  
 
A limitation with the approach we have used in this paper is that we cannot match 
socioeconomic status at individual level with administrative patient data.
20 Instead we are linking 
patients’ level data from administrative databases with data on income and education from 
population cells that combine gender, age and municipality. In this respect we follow a recent 
trend that makes use of administrative data to investigate inequalities in health or health care. To 
make the match between the cell averages and the administrative data as good as possible, we 
have chosen to focus on all elective care, and not some specific common procedures. However 
we have not included acute care in our analyses. This might potentially bias out results. 
Especially if it is the case that patients with lower socioeconomic status are more likely to get 
acute treatment. One reason for this might be that these patients have longer waiting time, and 
thus may become acute ill while waiting. But since we do not find much evidence of 
discrimination, we do not think our results are sensitive to the exclusion of acute care treatment.  
                                                 
19 The correlation between income and education is 0.63 (0.7) for men (women). 
20 We are not aware of any study that has access to such data.  
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 Table I. Variable description and summary statistics. 879 403 patient episodes. Income and educational 
achievement: 43 989 cell data points. 
All patients (N = 879 403) 
  Mean St.d.  Median Max  Min 
  Waiting time   Days  80.9  113.4  36  729  0 
  Age     56.8  17.5  57  93  26 
  Diagnoses  Number of diagnoses (main + secondary)  1.24  0.72  1  8  0 
  Procedures  Number of operation procedures  2.51  1.15  2  10  0 
  Income  Average earnings less capital income of  
cell population (2004, in 10
5 NOK)  2.39 0.84 2.26  12.1 0.16 
  Secondary education  Share of cell population with upper secondary but 
not tertiary education (2004)  0.544 0.173 0.556  1  0 
  Tertiary education  Share of cell population with at least one year of  
college/university educ. (2004)  0.176 0.130 0.167  1  0 
Male (N = 386 665) 
  Waiting time   Days  78.2  113.0  34  720  0 
  Age     57.7  58  58  93  26 
  Diagnoses  Number of diagnoses (main + secondary)  1.24  0.72  1  8  1 
  Procedures  Number of operation procedures  2.50  1.21  2  10  0 
  Income  Average earnings less capital income of  
cell population (2004, in 10
5 NOK)  2.88 0.85 2.93  12.1 0.92 
  Secondary education  Share of cell population with upper secondary but 
not tertiary education  0.570 0.174 0.582  1  0 
  Tertiary education  Share of cell population with at least one year of  
college/university educ. (2004)  0.160 0.111 0.156  1  0 
Female  (N = 492 748) 
  Waiting time     83.0  113.8  38  729  0 
  Age     56.0  18.0  56  93  26 
  Diagnoses  Number of diagnoses (main + secondary)  1.24  0.72  1  8  0 
  Procedures  Number of operation procedures  2.52  1.10  2  10  0 
  Income  Average earnings less capital income of  
cell population (2004, in 10
5 NOK)  1.92 0.50 1.95  6.76 0.16 
  Secondary education  Share of cell population with upper secondary but 
not tertiary education  0.518 0.168 0.533  1  0 
  Tertiary education  Share of cell population with at least one year of  
college/university educ. (2004)  0.191 0.145 0.174  1  0 
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Table II Effect of income on log (1+waiting time). t-statistics (absolute values) clustered at cell level reported in 
parentheses 
Male  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Top income quintile              Reference  category         
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2  0.007  0.297  0.379 0.615 0.631 0.631 0.632 
Female           
Top income quintile             
 
Reference  category      
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2  0.008  0.272  0.358 0.582 0.598 0.599 0.600 
Fixed  effects:           
  Birth  year  x  x  x x x x x 
  Main  diagnosis   x      
 Main diagnosis x 
 2
dary diagnoses  
   x       
 Main diagnosis x 
 2
dary diagnoses x  
 procedures 
      x x x x 
 Local hospital           x  x  x 
 Travel dist. x  age cuts             x  x 
 
Choice variables:  
         
 Other hospital than  
 local hospital  
         x  
 University hospital                x 




Table III Effect of income on zero waiting time (1a, 4a, 7a) and log (waiting time | waiting time > 0) (1b, 4b, 7b). t-
statistics (absolute values) clustered at cell level reported in parentheses 
  Male  (1a) (4a) (7a) (1b) (4b) (7b) 
Top income quintile                                
4



























































2  0.007 0.644 0.664 0.002 0.501 0.511 
Female        
Top income quintile             
 































































2  0.008 0.600 0.621 0.003 0.493 0.502 
Fixed  effects:        
  Birth  year  x x x x x x 
 Main diagnosis x 
 2
dary diagnoses x  
 procedures 
 x  x  x  x 
  Local  hospital       x    x 
 Travel dist. x  age cuts       x      x 
 
Choice variables:  
      
 Other hospital than  
 local hospital  
   x    x 
 University hospital        x      x 
  f i x e d   e f f e c t s             
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Table IV Effect of educational achievement on log (1+waiting time). t-statistics (absolute values) clustered at cell 
level reported in parentheses  
Male  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) 





























2  0.005 0.296 0.378  0.614  0.631 0.631 0.632 


































2  0.005 0.271 0.357  0.582  0.598 0.599 0.600 
Fixed  effects:           
 Birth year  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
  Main  diagnosis   x          
 Main diagnosis x 
 2dary diagnoses  
   x     
 Main diagnosis x 
 2dary diagnoses x  
 procedures 
   x  x  x  x 
 Local hospital           x  x  x 
 Travel distance x  
 age cuts  
       x  x 
Choice  variables:             
 Hospital not  
 local hospital  
        x  
 University hospital fixed  
 effects  




Table V Effect of educational achievement on zero waiting time (1a, 4a, 7a) and log (waiting time | waiting time > 
0) (1b, 4b, 7b). t-statistics (absolute values) clustered at cell level reported in parentheses 
  Male  (1a) (4a) (7a) (1b) (4b) (7b) 
 





























2  0.007 0.643 0.664 0.002 0.501 0.511 
Female        





























2  0.004 0.599 0.621 0.003 0.493 0.502 
Fixed  effects:        
  Birth  year  x x x x x x 
 Main diagnosis x 
 2
dary diagnoses x  
 procedures 
 x  x  x  x 
  Local  hospital       x    x 
 Travel dist. x  age cuts       x      x 
 
Choice variables:  
      
 Other hospital than  
 local hospital  
   x    x 
 University hospital        x      x 
  f i x e d   e f f e c t s             
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Table VI Effect of income on log (1+waiting time). Sensitivity analysis  
Regression   Male  a b c  d  e 
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 Female       
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a)  Replication of results in Table II 
b)  Patient episodes referred to hospital treatment 1/1 2004 - 30/6 2004 
c)  Without patients from five largest municipalities/parts of city 
d)  Alternative identification of follow-up treatment 






Table VII Effect of educational achievement on log (1+waiting time). Sensitivity analysis  
Regression Male a b  c  d e 

























































 Female         

























































            
 
a)  Replication of results reported in Table III 
b)  Patient episodes referred to hospital treatment 1/1 2004 - 30/6 2004  
c)  Without patients from five largest municipalities/parts of city 
d)  Alternative identification of follow-up treatment 
e)  Separate diagnoses/procedures fixed effects for inpatient treatment, day treatment and outpatient 
treatment 
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